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For over a decade, Congress has sought to eliminate racial dis-
crimination in employment. The effort began with the passage of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, aimed at private em-
ployment discrimination.' In 1972, Congress amended Title VII with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. 2 Section 717,3 added by
that Act, extended Title VII to cover the country's largest employer,
the federal government. 4 The Amendments to Title VII have done
little to eliminate federal employment discrimination.5 Part of the
reason for this failure is that Title VII offers limited monetary re-
lief-a maximum of two years back pay recovered from the govern-
ment treasury.0 There is no provision for the personal liability of
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, prohibits discrimination based on
color, sex, religion, and national origin, as well as race.
2. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp.
IV 1974).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. IV 1974).
4. The federal government employs over two and one-half million people. S. ReP. No.
92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1971). The Act also extended the protection of Title VII
to employees of state and local governments. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
5. Prior to the passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the Senate Com-
mittee on Labor and Public Welfare noted that "[s]tatistical evidence shows that
minorities and women continue to be denied access to a large number of governmentjobs, particularly in the higher grade levels." The Committee cited the following per-
centages of black employees under the General Schedule by grade level: GS-1 through
GS-4 (21.8 percent); GS-5 through GS-8 (13.5 percent); GS-9 through GS-11 (5.1 percent);
GS-12 through GS-13 (2.7 percent); GS-14 through GS-15 (1.7 percent); GS-16 through
GS-18 (1.4 percent). S. REP. No. 92-415, supra note 4, at 13. There is little indication that
§ 717 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 has done much to reduce the
widespread racial discrimination in federal employment that prompted Congress to
amend Title VII in 1972. See V UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERIL
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, at 15, 86 (1975); Abernathy, Sovereign Inmunity
in a Constitutional Governnzent: The Federal Employnent Discrimination Cases, 10
HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. Rev. 322, 324 (1975).
6. Section 706(g) of Title VII, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, authorizes the district court to grant the following remedies once a finding
of discrimination is made:
[To] enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice
and order such afffirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but
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government officials. This Note argues that such liability can be
provided by an alternative remedy for racial discrimination in federal
employment-an independent action for damages and back pay against
federal officials, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19817 and tailored by the
doctrine of qualified executive immunity.
I. The Inadequacy of Title VII
The two primary aims of Title VII are deterrence of employment
discrimination and compensation for discrimination which is not ef-
fectively deterred.8 Title VII does not adequately promote either of
these objectives. First, since the only monetary relief it provides is back
pay, Title VII is of limited effectiveness in deterring employment dis-
crimination. Punitive damages have a recognized deterrent effect," but
the lower courts have held that they are not available under Title
VII.1° Most important, because the monetary relief in federal suits is
is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
* .. or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability
shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of the charge
with the Commission. Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence
by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay
otherwise allowable.
The Supreme Court has recently held that an award of seniority status retroactive to
the date of individual job application is appropriate under § 706(g). Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 4356 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1976). The lower courts have generally
determined that punitive and compensatory damages are not available under Title VII.
See notes 10, 18 infra.
7. The statute derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31,
§ 1, 14 Stat. 27. After reenactment and codification, § 1 of the 1866 Act now appears as
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970). Section 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons . . . shall have the
same right ... to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens .... "
Originally enacted pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, the 1866 Act was reenacted
in 1870, two years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The reenactment
was to ground the Act on both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and to make
clear that it prohibits actions taken by the states. Section 1981 deals only with the
problem of racial discrimination; unlike Title VII, it does not prohibit discrimination
based on sex, religion, and national origin. Accordingly, the discussion in this Note is
limited to racial discrimination.
For a general discussion of the history of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the develop-
ment of § 1981 as a remedy for private discrimination, see Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 422-44 (1968), and Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to
Discriminate Versus Freedom From Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1445-46 (1975).
8. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-19 (1975).
9. Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1961, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1261 (1971); Goldberg, Implying Punitive
Damages in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9 HARV. Civ. RiIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv.
325, 34445 (1974).
10. Although punitive damages were awarded by the district court in Stamps v. Detroit
Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd, 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), the
lower courts generally have held that § 706(g) of Title VII does not provide for the
award of punitive damages and have refused to award them. E.g., Stamps v. Detroit
Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308-10 (6th Cir. 1975); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F.
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paid from the agency budget, 1 the federal official faces no personal
liability; his pocket is sealed. He is subject only to the relatively light
burden of an injunctive order, a threat which the Supreme Court has
termed "little incentive to shun practices of dubious legality.' 2
Second, Title VII fails to compensate adequately the victims of
both federal and private employment discrimination. The original
discriminatory practices or ill will engendered by litigation may mean
that the employee does not desire reinstatement. 13 The two-year limit
on back pay recovery under Title VII can unjustly deny back pay to a
litigant who has been the victim of discrimination for more than two
years.' 4 And back pay, even if unlimited, compensates the victim for
only part of the injury sustained. The courts have recognized that
the loss of a job because of discrimination deprives the employee of
more than just a wage. The employee suffers considerable humiliation
and mental anguish,' 5 as well as the loss of valuable experience and
Supp. 829, 835-38 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1974). But see Dessen-
berg v. American Metal Forming Co., 6 F.E.P. Cas. 159, 161 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (dictum);
Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Neb. 1972) (dictum); Developments in the
Law, supra note 9, at 1261-69; Goldberg, supra note 9, at 337-45 (arguing that "punitive
damages fit under the umbrella of affirmative action authorized by section 706(g)," id.
at 339). The Supreme Court has noted the position of the lower courts, but has not de-
cided this issue. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 458-59 n.5 (1975).
11. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.271, 550.804 (1974).
12. Albemarle Paper Co. Y. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
13. See Comment, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII,
54 VA. L. REv. 491, 492-93 (1968):
[T]he value of reinstatement or an order to hire varies with the nature of the em-
ployment which was denied the individual. The production-line worker may be able
to fade into an impersonal mass of employees, but where relationships with fellow-
employees are an important characteristic of a job, reinstatement is less practical. A
viable employment relationship clearly cannot be created by court order when the
position involves social relations, such as exist among professional men.
14. Isaacs, A Survey of Remedies Under Title VII, 5 COLUf. HuMAN RIGHTS L. RLv.
437, 440 (1973). There was no limit on recovery of back pay when Title VII was first
enacted in 1964. Congress imposed the two year -statute of limitations" as part of the
1972 amendments. See 117 CONG. REc. 31974 (1971) (statement of Rep. Erlenborn). One
proponent of the two year limitation explained that it was needed "so that back-pay
awards cannot be rendered in the year 2000 all the way back to the year 1965, as the
courts apparently are holding at the present time." Id. (statement of Rep. Erlenborn).
15. Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F. Supp. 832, 831 (W.D.
Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Discrimination is a
vicious act. It may destroy hope and any trace of self-respect. That, and not the loss of
pay, is perhaps the injury which is felt the most and the one which is the greatest.") Sec
generally Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 637-38 (7th Cir. 1974) (compensatory
damage award upheld in § 1982 action alleging racially motivated refusal to negotiate
for sale of dwelling because "humiliation [can be] inferred from the circumstances or
established by testimony"); Richardson v. Communications Workers of America, 443 F.2d
974, 983 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973) ("The damage arising from
invidious discrimination . . . may often times be measured only in terms of the mental
distress, anguish and humiliation caused."); Duda, Damages for Mental Suffering in Dis.
crintination Cases, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. RLV. 1 (1966).
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training.' 6 Although less readily quantified, these injuries are often
great; the employee should be compensated for them. The lower
courts, however, have generally held that compensatory damages (apart
from back pay)17 are not available under Title VII.18
Finally, the elaborate administrative procedures provided by Title
VII for federal employees tend to frustrate the statutory aims by im-
peding efforts to obtain relief.' 9
II. The Section 1981 Damage Suit
A. Deterrence and Compensation
In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, the Supreme Court recently
made clear that Title VII and § 1981 are independent remedies for
16. Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 869 F. Supp. 832, 834 (W.D.
Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974) (loss of a job "means the
loss of a sense of achievement and the loss of a chance to learn"); Ethridge v. Rhodes,
268 F. Supp. 83, 88 (S.D. Ohio 1967) ("[D]iscrimination in the area of employment stunts
the educational and technical potential development of the class subject to such in-
equities."); Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimina-
tion in Private Employment, 7 HARV. CIv. RiGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. Rav. 56, 96 (1972).
17. Recovery of back pay could be considered as payment of compensatory damages.
The courts, however, have usually characterized back pay as an integral part of the
equitable remedy of reinstatement. Therefore, for the purposes of this Note, back pay is
not included in the category of compensatory damages.
18. Most of the lower courts have determined that just as § 706(g) does not provide
for the award of punitive damages, see note 10 supra, it also does not provide for the
award of compensatory damages. E.g., Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 372 F. Supp. 854,
856 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829, 835-38 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Attkisson v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 5 F.E.P. Cas. 919, 920 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Tooles v.
Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Neb. 1972) (approving punitive damage awards in
dictum, but holding compensatory damages inappropriate); Developments in the Law,
supra note 9, at 1259-64 (arguing that punitive but not compensatory damages are avail-
able under Title VII). But see Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 96 (3d
Cir. 1973) (male employees who retired under a discriminatory pension can receive
damages to compensate them for their lost retirement benefits); Evans v. Sheraton Park
Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 179, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding $500 award for harassment of
the plaintiff for filing a complaint alleging sex discrimination; court suggested that
the award was for back pay); Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co., 369 F.
Supp. 832, 835 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1974)
(awarding damages to compensate the plaintiff for mental distress, stating that "the pur-
pose of the Act will best be served if all of the injuries which are caused by discrimina-
tion are entitled to recognition," and that the remedies explicitly provided by Title VII
were insufficient to compensate the plaintiff for all his injuries); Goldberg, supra note
9, at 366-70, (arguing that compensatory as well as punitive damages are available under
Title VII). As with punitive damages under Title VII, the Supreme Court has noted the
position of the lower courts without approving or disapproving it. Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 458-59 n.5 (1975).
19. Abernathy, supra note 5, at 325 n.10 (grievance procedures for federal employees
are "a model of bureaucratic obstructionism and delay"). For a summary of the ad-
ministrative procedures provided by Title VII for private and federal employees, see
Note, Federal Employment Discrimination: Scope of Inquhy and the Class Action Under
Title II, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1288 (1975).
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private employment discrimination. 20 In a suit brought under § 1981,
the plaintiff may recover punitive21 and compensatory22 damages as
well as unlimited back pay23-monetary relief which is not available
under Title VII. The § 1981 damage remedy for private employment
discrimination is a valuable supplement to Title VII; it holds a similar
promise for federal employment discrimination.
There can be little doubt that the spectre of personal liability is
much more likely to deter a federal official from discriminating than
the threat of an injunctive order or a recovery of back pay from the
federal agency.24 Moreover, as in private discrimination, a § 1981
20. 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (holding that timely filing of a Title VII employment dis-
crimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) does
not toll the running of the limitation period applicable to an action, based on the same
facts, brought under § 1981). The Court stated that the remedies available under § 1981
and Title VII for private employment discrimination "although related, and although
directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent." It noted that
"[ulnder some circumstances, the administrative route [of Title VII] may be highly
preferred over the litigatory; under others, the reverse may be true." Id. at 461.
21. Id. at 460 ("An individual who establishes a cause of action under § 1981 is
entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain
circumstances, punitive damages.") It is difficult to draw the line between compensatory
and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases and other suits involving
deprivations of constitutional rights. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 366-68. It is also
unclear what standard must be met for an award of punitive damages. The general rule
is that they may be imposed only if the "defendant has acted wilfully and in gross dis-
regard for the rights of the complaining party." Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429
F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970). But some courts have taken the view that the nature of the
harm involved in deprivations of constitutional rights in and of itself warrants the award
of punitive damages. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (suit for S5000
damages for denial of right to vote in primary election); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64, 66
(8th Cir. 1919) (52000 awarded each plaintiff for denial of right to vote); Fisher v. Volz,
496 F.2d 333, 346-488 n.23 (3d Cir. 1974) (punitive damages awarded for unconstitutional
police search); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965) (S1500 punitive damages in
§ 1983 suit against police officers). For a general discussion of standards for awarding
damages for violations of civil rights, see Richards, Compensatoiy and Punitive Damages
in Employment Discrimination Cases, 27 ARK. L. REv. 603 (1973); Note, Civil Actions for
Damages Under the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 45 TEXAs L. REV. 1015 (1967); Note,
Measuring Damages for Violations of Individuals' Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. U. L. REV.
357 (1974).
22. Compensatory damages may be granted to cover psychic injury, the loss of ex-
perience and training, and other expenses caused by the discrimination. See notes 15, 16
supra; McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 351
(1975) (§ 1981 action awarding damages for embarrassment, humiliation, and mental
anguish to parents of black children denied admission to private school on the basis of
race); Jackson v. Wheatley School Dist., 464 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1972) (compensatory
damages granted under § 1981 for loss of earnings and other expenses resulting from
discriminatory discharge of teacher); Lazard v. Boeing Co., 322 F. Supp. 343, 315 (E.D.
La. 1971) (compensatory damages available under § 1981 for lost wages and personal
humiliation). See generally Richards, supra note 21; Goldberg, supra note 9, at 366.
23. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) ("(A] backpay award
under § 1981 is not restricted to the two years specified for backpay recovery under
Title VII.")
24. See, e.g., Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under The Civil Rights Acts,
68 HARV. L. REv. 1229, 1233 (1955).
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action may increase the incentive to seek redress by providing larger
recoveries 25 and by eliminating the administrative burdens which
hinder recovery.206 Additional compensation might also provide the
employee with a financial cushion that would allow him to quit his
job and thus escape the discriminatory environment while looking for
new employment.
B. Section 1981 Applied to Federal Officials
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized § 1981
as an alternative remedy for federal employment discrimination, 27 a
growing number of lower courts have done So.2 8 In the leading case
25. Although § 1981 allows for the recovery of unlimited back pay and compensatory
and punitive damages, it does not necessarily provide for larger recoveries than Title VII.
Unlike § 1981, Title VII specifically allows an award of attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k) (Supp. IV 1974). See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
In light of the Supreme Court's recent ruling on attorney's fees in Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), attorney's fees are available in § 1981 suits
only if the defendants acted in bad faith, that is, if they are "unreasonable and ob-
durately obstinate." Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251, 1269 (5th Cir. 1975).
See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 430 (2d Cir.
1975). If bad faith can be proved, § 1981 would clearly provide a larger recovery than
would Title VII, since both attorney's fees and punitive damages could be recovered. If
bad faith cannot be proved, attorney's fees, and probably punitive damages, would not
be available. However, § 1981 may still yield a greater recovery where the jury gives
substantial awards to compensate for the stigma and psychic injury of racial discrimina-
tion, see notes 15, 22 supra, and where there is more than two years back pay at stake.
26. See p. 521 supra. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the question
whether an employee bringing a § 1981 action in federal court against a federal agency
or official must first exhaust the administrative procedures provided under § 717 of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. IV 1974). Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 507 F.2d
1300 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1975). An exhaustion requirement would
impair § 1981 as a fully independent remedy for federal employment discrimination. The
Supreme Court has held that private employees need not exhaust Title VII's administra-
tie procedures before instituting a § 1981 action. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
4121 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1975). There is no convincing reason to impose an exhaustion
requirement on federal employees where there is none for private employees. See Penn
v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1973), rev'd, 497 F.2d 970, 971, 975 (5th Cir. 1974)
(en banc) (Tuttle, J., dissenting) ("[This Court should not undertake to create a barrier
to the filing of a section 1981 suit against federal officials which does not exist in similar
actions against either state officials or private individuals"); Brief for Petitioner at 44-
67, Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 421 U.S. 987 (1975), granting cert. to 507 F.2d 1300
(2d Cir. 1974). But see Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 707-14 (5th Cir. 1973) (Godbold,
J., dissenting), rev'd, 497 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) (adopting Judge God-
bold's dissent per curiam); Comment, Exhaustion of Federal Administrative Remedies in
Cases Under Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act, 1974 DuxE L. RF-v. 408.
27. The issue is now before the Supreme Court in Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,
507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 987 (1975). The Second Circuit held
that § 717 of Title VII impliedly repealed all other causes of action against federal
officials, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question "Is jurisdiction .. .
conferred by statutes enacted prior to the adoption in 1972 of Section 717 of Title VII?"
Brief for Petitioner at 1, Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 421 U.S. 987 (1975), granting
cert. to 507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974).
28. These decisions rely principally on District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418,
422, 432-33 (1973) (holding that § 1983 does not apply to the District of Columbia, but
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of Bowers v. Campbell,29 Judge Hufstedler reached this conclusion
by the following reasoning: in District of Columbia v. Carter, the Su-
preme Court stated in dictum that § 1982 (the companion statute to
§ 1981) applies to federal as well as state action." Later that year in
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, the Court stated that
because both §§ 1981 and 1982 are based on the Thirteenth Amend-
ment and derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, they should
be similarly construed.31 Hence § 1981 applies to the federal govern-
ment, and specifically to federal employment discrimination.
A § 1981 suit may be brought against a federal official in both his
official and his private capacities. Some courts have ruled that § 717
of the 1972 amendments to Title VII impliedly repealed the § 1981
cause of action against an official in his official capacity.3 2 The basis
for this position is that when Congress amended Title VII in the
spring of 1972, the consensus in the lower courts was that sovereign
immunity absolutely barred § 1981 suits against the federal govern-
ment.3 3 It is argued that in § 717 Congress granted federal employees
noting in dictum that § 1982 applies to the federal government). See Bowers v. Campbell,
505 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 1974) (relying also on Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recrea-
tion Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973)); Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 702-03 (5th Cir. 1973),
rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc); Henry v. Schlesinger, 44
U.S.L.W. 2375 (E.D. Pa., Jan. 7, 1976); Fleming v. Simon, 397 F. Supp. 1202, 1203 (N.D.
Cal. 1975) (relying on Bowers); Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 1975)
(relying on Bowers); Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 388 F. Supp. 1205,
1207-08 (D. Md. 1975) (relying also on Tillman).
29. 505 F.2d 1155, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 1974) (action by federal employee seeking injunc-
tive and declaratory relief and back pay against officers of United States air station on
ground that she was removed from a trainee position, denied later promotions, harassed,
and reprimanded because of her race).
30. 409 U.S. 418, 422 (1973) (the Court noted that § 1982 bars all discrimination in the
sale or rental of property "private as well as public, federal as well as state" (emphasis
added)).
31. 410 U.S. 431, 439 (1973) (holding that § 1981 and § 1982 should be similarly
construed when applied to a claim that a community swimming pool was a private club).
The basis for the holding was the "historical interrelationship" between § 1981 and
§ 1982. Id. at 439-40 n.11.
32. The Second Circuit is the only court of appeals that has taken this position.
Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987
(1975). Some district courts have followed Brown. E.g., Cozad v. Johnson, 397 F. Supp.
1235, 1238 (W.D. Okla. 1975). In Cozad, the court distinguished both Revis v. Laird, 391
F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Cal. 1975), and Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974),
because these suits had arisen prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII. The Cozad
court reasoned that Bowers and Revis did not involve what it called the "pure" preemp-
tion issue-that is, whether § 717 added by the 1972 amendments preempts a claim
arising after the enactment of the amendments. The court held that these post-amend-
ment claims were preempted.
33. This consensus rested in large part on Judge (now Justice) Blackmun's decision
in Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970),
cited in Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 507 F.2d 1300, 1307 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
421 U.S. 987 (1975). See Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 388 F. Supp. 1205,
1207 (D. Md. 1975); Abernathy, supra note 5, at 337-40. Recently, however, this consensus
has eroded. See note 103 infra.
Damages for Federal Employment Discrimination
a private right of action which it believed did not previously exist,
and hence that the waiver of sovereign immunity in § 717 must be
strictly construed as an implied repeal of § 1981 to the extent that
§ 1981 might reach federal employment discrimination.3"
This argument is unpersuasive. Neither the language35 nor the
legislative history36 of the 1972 amendments suggests that Congress
intended to repeal § 1981. Applying § 717 in a different context, the
Supreme Court recently reasserted that repeals by implication are
disfavored. 37 In addition, since Congress enacted § 717 to give federal
employees the same rights already enjoyed by private workers,38 the
34. Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 507 F.2d 1300, 1306 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
421 U.S. 987 (1975).
35. Section 717(c) indicates that Congress intended not to repeal any existing statutes:
Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government agency or official of
its or his primary responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment as required
by the Constitution and statutes or of its or his responsibilities under Executive
Order 11478 relating to equal employment opportunity in the Federal Government.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(e) (Supp. IV 1974) (emphasis added).
36. Although Congress did take notice of the sovereign immunity issue raised in suits
against federal officials, it did not indicate an intent to repeal § 1981. For instance, the
report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare noted:
The testimony of the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding, the committee
found that an aggrieved Federal employee does not have access to the courts. In many
cases, the employee must overcome a U.S. Government defense of sovereign immunity
or failure to exhaust administrative remedies with no certainty as to the steps re-
quired to exhaust such remedies. Moreover, the remedial authority of the Com-
mission and the courts has also been in doubt.
S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971).
One week before the Senate debated the extension of Title VII to federal employment
discrimination, it rejected an amendment to Title VII which would have expressly re-
pealed § 1981 as a remedy for private employment discrimination. 118 CONG. REc. 3965
(1972). The Hruska Amendment to S. 2515 proposed to make Title VII "the exclusive
remedy of any person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful employment practice of
an employer, employment agency, or labor organization." 118 CONG. REc. 3173 (1972).
Speaking in opposition to the Hruska amendment, several senators emphasized the im-
portance of the civil rights statutes as independent remedies for employment discrimina-
tion. Senator Javits made the following statement before the floor vote:
There are other remedies [than Title VII], but those other remedies are not sur-
plusage. Those other remedies are needed to implement the promise we make under
the Constitution to prevent discrimination in employment. The laws of 1866, 1871,
as well as the law of 1964, are to implement that promise.
118 CONG. REC. 3961 (1972). In the same debate, Senator Williams quoted the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, and said:
The statute I have quoted was followed up, in 1871, by another provision. These
are basic laws from which, as the Attorney General stated, developed a body of law
that should be preserved and not wiped out, and that all available resources should
be used in the effort to correct discrimination in employment.
118 CONG. Rrc. 3964 (1972). The Senate rejected a similar amendment to Title VII in
1964. 110 CoNG. REc. 13650-52 (1964) (Tower amendment).
37. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549, 551 (1974), the Court held that the
federal anti-discrimination provisions of § 717 did not repeal the apparently inconsistent
preference for Indian employees in the Bureau of Indian Affairs under the Indian Re-
organization Act of 1934. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1970).
38. See 118 CoNG. Rmc. 4922 (1972) (remarks of Sen. H.A. Williams); S. REP. No. 92-415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971).
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courts should construe § 717 by relying on the meaning and the
construction of Title VII as applied to private employees.,19 The
Court's recent decision in Johnson is grounded on the proposition
that Title VII did not impliedly repeal § 1981 as a remedy for private
employees. 40 The § 1981 suit should thus be available as an alternative
remedy for federal as well as private employment discrimination. In
any event, even if the § 1981 action against the official in his official
capacity is impliedly repealed by § 717, a § 1981 suit against the
official in his personal capacity may still be brought.41
The efficacy of the § 1981 remedy ultimately turns on the judicial
application of two distinct doctrines of governmental immunity. If
a § 1981 suit for back pay and damages is brought against a private
employer, the employer is the only possible source of recovery, and
there is, of course, no immunity doctrine to protect him. But if a
similar suit is brought against a government official, there are two
sources of recovery-the government and the official in his private
capacity-and each is protected by a separate immunity doctrine. When
the victim of discrimination sues the official in his official capacity,
the suit is directed at the government treasury, and sovereign im-
munity can be invoked as a defense.42 But when the victim sues the
official in his private capacity, the major obstacle to recovery is execu-
tive immunity, the protector of the official's pocket.
39. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 421 U.S. 987 (1975),
granting cert. to 507 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1974).
40. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (citation omitted):
Despite Title ViI's range and its design as a comprehensive solution for the prob-
lem of invidious discrimination in employment, the aggrieved individual clearly is not
deprived of other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in his search
for relief. ... In particular, Congress noted "that the remedies available to the in-
dividual under Title VII are co-extensive with the individual's right to sue under the
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that the two pro-
cedures augment each other and are not mutually exclusive."
41. Miller v. Saxbe, 396 F. Supp. 1260, 1262 (D.D.C. 1975). In Miller, Judge Gesell held
that the plaintiffs' cause of action against the United States for back pay and promotion
under § 1981 was preempted by Title III, but allowed the § 1981 action for damages and
injunctive relief against the individual defendants to proceed.
42. Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity bars suit against a federal officer in his
official capacity if the request for relief would run against the Government's property or
funds, would interfere with the public administration, or would require action by the
sovereign. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963). But there are two exceptions to this
rule: if the officer's actions are either beyond his statutory authority, or unconstitu-
tional, the suit is not barred. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682, 701-02 (1949); Dugan v. Rank, supra at 621-22. These two exceptions are commonly
referred to as the Larson-Dugan exceptions. Under these exceptions, however, sovereign
immunity may still limit the relief sought to the extent that it "will require afffirma-
rive action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property."
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III. Qualified Executive Immunity
For most of the 20th century, executive officials with discretionary
duties have generally enjoyed an absolute immunity from damage
suits.4 3 The absolute immunity rule rested on two "mutually de-
pendent rationales": it would be unfair to subject officials with dis-
cretionary duties to personal liability, and the threat of liability would
deter such officials from performing their jobs effectively.44 In 1974,
however, the Supreme Court cut back this immunity with its decision
in Scheuer v. Rhodes,43 holding that under some circumstances high
level executive officials may be personally liable for damages.
A. State Officials
In Scheuer and Wood v. Strickland,46 the Court defined a "quali-
fied"47 executive immunity to be applied in civil damage suits for
deprivations of constitutional rights. Both Scheuer and Wood involved
civil rights actions brought under § 1983 against state officials.48 In
Scheuer, the parents of the students killed during campus demonstra-
tions at Kent State University sued the Governor of Ohio and other
high level state officials, alleging that the defendants had deprived
their children of life without due process of law.49 The Supreme Court
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., supra at 691 n.11. For a discussion of
sovereign immunity in federal employment discrimination suits, see Abernathy, supra
note 5; Freed, Suits to Remedy Discrimination in Government Employment-The Im-
munity Problem, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 383 (1973); notes 103-07 infra.
43. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896);
Fidtler v. Rundle, 497 F.2d 794, 798-802 (3d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d
820, 823-27 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974); Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d
430 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Martone v.
McKeithen, 413 F.2d 1373, 1375 (5th Cir. 1969); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 859-60
n.5 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965) (list of cases applying absolute im-
munity doctrine to suits against officials for many different torts); Francis v. Lyman,
216 F.2d 583, 588-89 (Ist Cir. 1954); Note, supra note 24, at 1229-32; Comment, Civil
Liability of Subordinate State Officials Under the Federal Civil Rights Acts and the
Doctrine of Official Immunity, 44 CAL. L. REv. 887, 891 (1956).
44. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1974).
45. Id. For discussions of the case, see Note, Sovereign Immunity-Scheuer v. Rhodes:
Reconciling Section 1983 Damage Actions with Government Immunities, 53 N.C.L. REv.
439 (1974); Comment, Scheuer v. Rhodes: A Restatement of Absolute Immunity, 60 Iowa
L. REV. 191 (1974).
46. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). The case is discussed in The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89
HARV. L. REV. 219 (1975).
47. 416 U.S. at 247.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of [state law] subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured ....
-9. 416 U.S. at 235. The complaints alleged that the defendant officials "'intentionally,
recklessly, willfully and wantonly' caused an unnecessary deployment of the Ohio Na-
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reversed the holding of the court of appeals that the suit was barred
by the common law doctrine of executive immunity.0 0 Despite the
Court's extensive discussion of common law precedent,5' its decision
modified the old immunity doctrine in two fundamental ways. First,
the Court made an implicit distinction between torts such as defama-
tion that are not of constitutional magnitude and deprivations of
constitutional rights. Before 1974, the Court had granted public of-
ficials absolute immunity in two defamation suits,52 and some lower
courts had extended absolute immunity to officials in suits alleging
constitutional deprivations.53 In Scheuer, where the plaintiffs claimed
denials of constitutional rights, the Court distinguished its two defama-
tion decisions and thus failed to endorse this extension5 4
Second, Scheuer moved away from the traditional "duty" analysis
of immunity. Before Scheuer, the immunity question usually turned
on the type of duties performed by the official. The courts categorized
duties as either "ministerial" or "discretionary."' ' Because lower level
tional Guard on the Kent State campus and, in the same manner, ordered the Guard
members to perform allegedly illegal actions which resulted in the deaths of [the
students]." Id.
50. The district court had dismissed the actions because they were against the state
and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Note, supra note 45, at 441 n.15. The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding alternatively that an unqualified ex-
ecutive immunity protected the defendants. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.
1972). The Supreme Court reversed the dismissals and held that the claimants were
"entitled to be heard more fully than is possible on a motion to dismiss a complaint."
416 U.S. at 250.
51. 416 U.S. at 243-46. The Court reviewed the development of the common law
doctrine of executive immunity and discussed its previous decisions applying common
law immunity doctrines under § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967), and
Tenney v. Brandhove, 841 U.S. 367 (1951), extended to § 1983 actions the absolute im-
munity afforded by the common law to judicial and legislative officials. The Pierson
Court also relied on common law precedent in holding that police officers were entitled
to only a qualified immunity in a § 1983 action. 386 U.S. at 555. The Scheuer Court did
not ite comparable common law to support its holding.
52. Barr v. Matteo, 360 I.S. 564 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). In
Spalding, the Court held that the Postmaster General and his fellow cabinet members
enjoyed an absolute immunity in defamation suits, regardless of allegations of malicious
intent. Barr extended absolute immunity to a lower federal official, the Acting Director
of the Office of Rent Stabilization.
53. E.g., lower court cases cited in note 43 supra. But see Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d
178, 205 n.51 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1972); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968).
54. The Court did not expressly distinguish torts such as defamation from depriva-
tions of constitutional rights. But it did note that if high executive officers were given
an absolute immunity, "'the fiat of a state Governor, and not the Constitution of the
United States, would be the supreme law of the land .... There is no such avenue of
escape from the paramount authority of the Federal Constitution.'" 416 U.S. at 248-49,
quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 397 (1932). Some of the lower courts have
since commented on the distinction more explicitly. E.g., States Marine Lines, Inc. v.
Schultz, 498 F.2d 1141, 1159 n.12 (4th Cir. 1974); Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 489,
502 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
55. Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1975) ("Prior to Scheuer, executive
officers were granted absolute immunity from damage suits if they were acting within
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executive officials such as police officers were said to exercise minis-
terial duties, they enjoyed only the limited protection of qualified
immunity5a But higher level officials, to the extent they exercised
discretion, were cloaked with absolute immunity no matter what they
did.57 Judicial attempts to resolve the immunity claims of officials
with duties falling somewhere between these two poles pointed up the
inadequacy of this rigid classification.s
Although the Scheuer test considers the type of duties exercised by
the defendant official, it does not turn on the ministerial-discretionary
distinction. Rather, if a deprivation of a constitutional right is alleged,
the official, no matter what his duties, does not enjoy absolute pro-
tection from a damage suit. Scheuer states two requirements for
immunity: the official must have a good faith belief in the constitu-
tionality of his conduct, and his belief must be reasonable, considered
in light of all the circumstances as they appeared at the time of the
alleged harm. ° Although good faith belief is a subjective factor, the
companion "reasonableness of belief" standard injects an objective
component into the immunity test.
There is a critical factual difference between Scheuer and Wood v.
the outer perimeter of their scope of authority and were performing a discretionary as
opposed to a ministerial act."); Estate of Burks v. Ross, 438 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1971);
Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv. L. REv. 209, 219
(1963) (discussing the inadequacy of this approach).
56. See, e.g., Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd in part on other
grounds sub nora. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (Bazelon, J.) (ar-
resting officer not protected by absolute immunity in § 1983 suit because his act was
ministerial rather than discretionary); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
FBI, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972) (on remand from the Supreme Court). As Judge Medina
explained in Bivens, it is clearly a "fiction" to say that a police officer does not
exercise discretion in making an arrest. The fiction is maintained, he said, "because of
the belief that the benefit to society derived from the protection of personal liberties
outweighs the detriment of perhaps deterring vigorous police action." Id. at 1346.
57. See cases and articles cited in note 43 supra.
58. Compare, e.g., Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (1970), rev'd, aird -modified
in part sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (state prison warden held
liable for constitutional deprivation), and Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129, 134 & n.l1 (2d
Cir. 1966) (director of state mental hospital found liable for constitutional deprivation),
with Fidtler v. Rundle, 497 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1974) (state prison warden immune if his
duties were discretionary), and Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1973) (federal
prison warden absolutely immune from damage suits for alleged deprivations- of con-
stitutional rights).
59. The Court stated the test as follows:
These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified immunity is avail-
able to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent
upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the cir-
cumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability
is sought to be based. It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed
at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that
affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the
course of official conduct.
416 U.S. at 247-48.
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Strickland.00 In Wood, school board members volunteering their time
to serve the community' were sued by high school students who
claimed they had been expelled without due process; 2 the school
officials were not full-time, paid government employees. Reaffirming
the standard of liability announced in Scheuer, the Court held
that a school board member is not immune from liability for
damages under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have
known that the action he took within his sphere of official re-
sponsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student
affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the
student.63
Writing for the majority, Justice White stated that under the objective
component of the test a voluntary school board member is liable if he
violates a student's constitutional rights in "ignorance or disregard of
settled, indisputable law"; the official is held to a standard of con-
duct based on "knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional
rights of his charges." 64
The Court did not make clear what it meant by "settled, indis-
putable law." ' It has been suggested that this standard affords all
types of government officials broad immunity and that only an
authoritative decision by the Supreme Court would be sufficient to
meet the standard. 0 Yet post-Wood case law indicates that this analysis
60. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
61. See id. at 320 n.11, 322.
62. The students were expelled for violating a school regulation prohibiting the use
or possession of intoxicating beverages at school. The district court directed a verdict
for the defendants, ruling that officials cannot be held liable in damages for mistakes of
law unless malice is proven. Strickland v. Inlow, 348 F. Supp. 244, 248 OW.D. Ark. 1972).
The court of appeals reversed the directed verdicts for the school board members, reject-
ing the district court's "subjective" test in favor of an "objective" test of good faith,
but affirmed directed verdicts for school officials other than school board members.
Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1973). Both of the lower court rulings
were made before Scheuer announced both "objective" and "subjective" requirements
for executive immunity.
63. 420 U.S. at 322.
64. Id. at 321, 322.
65. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Powell (joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist) pressed this point: "One need only look
to the decisions of this Court . . . to recognize the hazard of even informed prophecy as
to what are 'unquestioned constitutional rights.'" Justice Powell endorsed the Scheuer
test, which he viewed as a "considerably less demanding standard of liability." Id. at 330.
However, because "settled law" may mean an authoritative Supreme Court decision, the
Wood test has, if anything, provided officials with more protection from liability than
the Scheuer standard. The Supreme Court, 1974 Terin, supra note 46, at 224-25 & nn.40,
41, quoted in note 66 infra.
66. The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra note 46, at 224-25 (footnote omitted):
[P]rior to an authoritative Supreme Court decision on an issue, disagreements among
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paints too broad a stroke. Although the "settled law" standard may
require nothing less than a Supreme Court decision, it has been ap-
plied primarily to volunteer school board members. 67 When paid
government officials are involved, a more general test of reasonable-
ness has been consulted to determine liability.68 In its latest appli-
cation of the doctrine of qualified executive immunity, a unani-
mous Supreme Court adopted this approach, consulting both Scheuer
and Wood in considering the liability of a paid state official.69 Under
the Scheuer-Wood standard, even if a judge finds that the law is not
courts, or perhaps even among commentators, about the applicable law should be
sufficient to bar liability. . . .Wood actually restricts significantly the number of
instances in which officials can be held liable for mistakes of law, without foreclosing
altogether the possibility of such liability.
Compare Picha v. Wielgos, 44 U.S.L.W. 2434 (N.D. IIl., Mar. 4, 1976) (law may be settled
without there having been a specific case with identical facts; relying on decision of
another district court to settle Fourth Amendment protection required for student
searched by school official with police involvement).
67. E.g., Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 1975); Shirley v.
Chagrin Falls Exempted Village Schools Bd. of Educ., 521 F.2d 1329, 1331-32 (6th Cir.
1975); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist. No. 7, 519 F.2d 961, 968 (9th Cir. 1975)
("the courts themselves have been split" on constitutional issue involved); Zeller v.
Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600, 609 (3d Cir. 1975) (en bane) (Rosenn, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (division among circuits and absence of Supreme Court opinion
makes law unsettled); Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172, 178 (5th Cir. 1975) (law unsettled
because of absence of decisions by Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit).
68. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (superintendent of a state mental
hospital); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 872 (3d Cir. 1975) (FBI officials alleged to
have violated the constitutional rights of high school students and teacher); Laverne v.
Corning, 522 F.2d 1144, 1147-50 (2d Cir. 1975) (inspections by village officials); Mark v.
Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis on Scheuer in suit brought by tax
accountant alleging violation of constitutional rights by IRS agents); Jones v. Diamond,
519 F.2d 1090, 1101 (5th Cir. 1975) (members of county board of supervisors and others);
Bryan v. Jones, 519 F.2d 44, 46 (5th Cir. 1975) (sheriff found by jury to have falsely
imprisoned plaintiff); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 261 (5th Cir. 1975) (university
president violated First Amendment rights of editors of student newspaper); Glasson v.
City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 910-11 (6th Cir. 1975) (policemen violated plaintiff's
First Amendment rights); Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3, 5-6 (4th Cir. 1975) (students
disciplined by university president because of letter published in school newspaper).
69. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Donaldson alleged that O'Connor, the
superintendent of a Florida state mental hospital, and other staff members had inten-
tionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional right to liberty. The jury
found for Donaldson and awarded $28,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in
punitive damages. The court of appeals affirmed. 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974). But the
court of appeals did not consider whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct
the jury that O'Connor was not liable if he had relied on state law not yet declared
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court remanded for a determination of this narrow
question in light of the immunity test stated in Wood. 422 U.S. at 577, on remand, 519
F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1975) (reconsidered only in light of Wood). Although the Court made
only passing reference to Scheuer, it made no reference to the more protective "settled
law" standard applied to the school board members in Wood.
In Imbler v. Pachtman, 44 U.S.L.W. 4250, 4253 n.13 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1976) (prosecutor
given absolute immunity in § 1983 action), the Court briefly discussed qualified execu-
tive immunity. Citing both Scheuer and Wood, it noted that "[t]he fate of an official
with qualified immunity depends upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions,
as established by the evidence at trial."
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fully "settled," a jury may still determine that the official "reasonably
should have known" that the action he took would violate constitu-
tional rights.7 0 Reasonableness is determined in large part by the type
of duties performed by the official, a factor that cuts two ways. Be-
cause higher level officials exercise discretion, they may be entitled to
more immunity.71 But because of their increased responsibilities, they
also have a greater duty to know the law, a consideration that militates
against immunity.
The distinction between voluntary and paid officials makes sense.
In Wood, both the majority and minority emphasized that if citizens
are not to be deterred from serving the community as volunteer school
board members, they must be given more protection from liability
than regular government officials -.7 2 This reasoning applies with equal
force to other volunteer officials. Some courts, however, have ignored
the rationale of Wood and shielded nonvolunteer officials with the
more protective "settled" law standard.73
B. Federal Officials
The lower courts have also applied the Scheuer-Wood standard to
federal officials, including cabinet members.74 Since § 1983 makes
70. The "settled law" and "reasonableness" standards will often, but not always,
produce different results. See Shirley v. Chagrin Falls Exempted Village Schools Bd. of
Educ., 521 F.2d 1329, 1331 (6th Cir. 1975). In that case, the district judge found liability
under Scheuer; the Vood decision intervened, and the court of appeals reversed the
district judge, applying the "settled law" standard to school board officials.
71. Most courts have emphasized that the less discretion an official has, the less
immunity is warranted. E.g., Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1380-81 (9th Cir. 1975).
72. The majority noted that "[t]he most capable candidates for school board posi-
tions might be deterred from seeking office if heavy burdens upon their private resources
from monetary liability were a likely prospect during their tenure." 420 U.S. at 320;
see id. at nn.ll & 12. Justice Powell concluded his dissent with this observation:
In view of today's decision significantly enhancing the possibility of personal
liability, one must wonder whether qualified persons will continue in the desired
numbers to volunteer for service in public education.
Id. at 331.
73. See, e.g., Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975)
(school superintendent, principal, athletic director and soccer coach); Bertot v. School
Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 1975) (superintendent and principal); Knell
v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975) (director of state department of corrections);
Picha v. Wielgos, 44 U.S.LAV. 2434 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 4, 1976) (school principal, nurse, and
psychologist). But see cases cited in note 68 supra; Zeller v. Donegal School Dist. Bd. of
Educ., supra at 612-13 (Seitz, J., dissenting). Judge Seitz noted that Wood
intimates nothing with respect to the immunity or good faith defense of officials
such as a school superintendent, principal, athletic director or soccer coach . ...
Certainly the individual defendants here are cloaked with different types of authority
and are charged with performing different acts ....
Citing Scheuer, he suggested that a reasonableness standard was appropriate for school
officials other than school board members.
74. Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (FBI agents); Mark v. Groff, 521
F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1975) (IRS agents); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
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only state officials liable for deprivations of constitutional rights, suits
against federal officers have relied on other statutory and common
law remedies7 5 However, the doctrine of qualified executive immunity
applies whether or not the suit is brought under § 1983, as long as a
state or federal official is alleged to have deprived the plaintiff of a
constitutional right.
IV. The Section 1981 Remedy for
Federal Employment Discrimination
Federal employment discrimination on the basis of race is a depriva-
tion of constitutional rights. In suits brought against the states under
§§ 1981 and 1983, the courts have held that racial discrimination in
employment violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.70 In Bolling v. Sharpe,77 the Supreme Court determined
that racial discrimination which would violate the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if practiced by a state violates
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment if practiced by the
federal government. Therefore, federal employment discrimination
(Attorney General of the United States, the Deputy Attorney General, and the Chief of
Police of the District of Columbia); Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir. 1974)
(Director of Secret Service and other Secret Service agents); States Marine Lines, Inc. v.
Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974) (Secretary of the Treasury and agents of the United
States Bureau of Customs); Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (Attorney
General of the United States and Director of the FBI); Fleming v. Simon, 397 F. Supp.
1202 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (Secretary of the Treasury and others); Miller v. Saxbe, 396 F.
Supp. 1260 (D.D.C. 1975) (Attorney General and others); Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp.
1133 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, Commander,
Vice-Commander and Deputy Commander of McClellan Air Force Base, Chief of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Office and others); Black v. United States, 388 F. Supp.
805 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Secretary of the Treasury, Commissioner of IRS, and District
Director of IRS).
75. Statutory remedies include 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1970). For discussion of these
statutes, see notes 7, 30 supra. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI, 403
U.S. 388 (1971), the Court established a federal common law right to sue for damages
for violations of Fourth Amendment rights. The lower courts have generally held both
First and Fifth Amendment claims cognizable under the Bivens rationale. Paton v. La
Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975) (First Amendment); Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376 (9th
Cir. 1975) (Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Rowley v. McMillan, 502 F.2d 1326 (4th Cir.
1974) (First and Fifth Amendments); States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146
(4th Cir. 1974) (Fifth Amendment); Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972) (Fifth
Amendment); Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (First and Fifth Amend-
ments); Black v. United States, 388 F. Supp. 805 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (Fifth Amendment);
Butler v. United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Hawaii 1973) (First and Fifth Amendments).
76. E.g., Afro Am. Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294, 301 (6th Cir. 1974);
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 733 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance
v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176-77 (2d Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F.2d 315, 325 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
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challenged in § 1981 suits deprives plaintiffs of Fifth Amendment
rights.78 The standards used by courts under § 1981 to define state
and federal employment discrimination are those used in employment
discrimination cases under Title VII.79
A. Executive Immunity and Personal Liability of Federal Officials
Two district courts have considered claims of executive immunity
by federal officials charged with racial discrimination in employ-
ment. 0 Assuming that the defendant officials are responsible for the
conduct challenged as discriminatory,8' liability should be found
under Scheuer and Wood in either of two instances: if the official
acted in bad faith, or if his belief in the constitutionality of his conduct
was unreasonable s.82 Bad faith is particularly hard to prove in employ-
ment discrimination cases because the discriminatory practices are
often facially neutral.8 3 Liability is easier to establish under the
"reasonable belief" standard. A finding that a federal official has
77. 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (public school segregation in the District of Columbia).
78. E.g., Miller v. Saxbe, 403 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (D.D.C. 1975) (§ 1981 federal em-
ployment discrimination suit in which Judge Gesell refused to grant summary judgment
for defendants, noting that federal officials must "confine their actions to conduct
consistent with elementary constitutional standards, particularly where issues of race are
involved").
79. See cases cited in note 76 supra. "No court has distinguished the standard
mandated by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments from that specified by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 957 n.2 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975).
Under Title VII, facially neutral tests, practices, or procedures that have a dispropor-
tionate impact on blacks must be shown to have a "demonstrable relationship" to successful
job performance, p. 535 infra. The lower courts have recognized that the Title VII
"demonstrable relationship" standard may require the state or federal employer to make
a stronger showing than the Fourteenth Amendment "rational relationship" test, but
have uniformly applied the Title VII standard in suits under §§ 1981 and 1983 alleging
constitutional violations. The Supreme Court may decide this issue in Davis.
80. Miller v. Saxbe, 396 F. Supp. 1260, 403 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1975) (§ 1981 suit
brought by two black United States deputy marshals charging racial discrimination in
federal employment; court held that Scheuer-lfood test for executive immunity would
apply); Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (§ 1981 suit alleging racial dis-
crimination in employment at McClellan Air Force Base in California; court confused
sovereign and executive immunity). For a discussion of these cases, see note 108 infra.
81. For two cases in which legal responsibility either was not or might not have been
found, see Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 94-95 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Justice Department
defendants asserted on appeal that the record contained no evidence of their participation
in or direction of the law enforcement activities of which plaintiffs complained); Miller
v. Saxbe, 403 F. Supp. 1314, 1316 (D.D.C. 1975) (motion for summary judgment granted
for one defendant, a U.S. Marshal, because "he is not shown to have ordered or to have
had responsibility for any of the specific alleged acts constituting the underlying basis
for the complaint").
82. See pp. 527-32 supra.
83. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971); Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and
Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of
Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. Rv. 1598, 1670 (1969).
534
Damages for Federal Employment Discrimination
violated "settled" employment discrimination law should be sufficient
to establish that an official's belief in the constitutionality of his
conduct was unreasonable. Since federal employment discrimination
suits are brought against paid rather than voluntary officials, however,
such a showing should not be necessary to establish liability.8 4
Recent Supreme Court decisions have "settled" the basic Title VII
principles which apply in § 1981 actions.sa Purportedly neutral "prac-
tices, procedures, or tests" which have a substantially disproportionate
impact on blacks must be shown to have a "demonstrable relationship"
to successful job performance."0 Even if such a relationship is estab-
lished, the complainant may still demonstrate that "other tests or
selection devices without a similarly undesirable racial effect" were
available, and that the employer has therefore used the tests merely
as a "pretext" for discrimination.s7
These principles have now been applied under both Title VII and
§ 1981 to testing s and seniority"9 practices affecting hiring and promo-
tion decisions.90 Findings of discrimination under these constitutional
standards should be sufficient to support a conclusion that the official
had no reasonable basis for a belief in the constitutionality of his
conduct. And even if the unconstitutionality of his conduct were not
"settled" at the time of the discrimination, a jury may still find that
84. See pp. 531-32 supra.
85. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1973); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
86. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). In Griggs the Court focused
on the job-relatedness requirements set forth in the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1975), promulgated to implement
Title VII. The Court noted that "[t]he touchstone is business necessity" and that "good
intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability." 401 U.S. at 431-32.
The lower courts have determined that there is no substantive difference between the
EEOC guidelines as construed in Griggs and the yet to be interpreted Civil Service Com-
mission guidelines for federal employment practices, 5 C.F.R. §§ 300.102, 300.103 (1974).
The "demonstrable relationship" standard applies to federal as well as private employ-
ment discrimination. Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Davis v.
Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 961-62 n.37 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 33 (1975).
87. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (dictum); accord, Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801, 804-05 (1973).
88. Eg., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (Title VII); Kirkland v.
New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 426 (2d Cir. 1975) (§ 1981
and § 1983).
89. E.g., Sabala v. Western Gilette, Inc., 516 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1975) (§ 1981); United
States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906
(1972) (Title VII).
90. There are, of course, areas of Title VII litigation in which the law is less settled.
See, e.g., Note, Last Hired, First Fired Layoffs and Title I'll, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1544
(1975).
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his belief was unreasonable in light of all the circumstances. The
type of duties exercised by the federal official would of course be
important for such a determination. For instance, although the Di-
rector of the Civil Service Commission might be held liable for the
use of standardized tests that violate clearly established principles of
employment discrimination,0 1 the Secretary of Defense might not be
held liable for discrimination at a particular military base. 2
Once liability is determined, back pay and punitive and compensa-
tory damages may be assessed against the official in his individual
capacity. Although immunity from damages does not ordinarily bar
equitable relief, 3 and back pay is viewed as an integral part of the
equitable relief of reinstatement, 94 a back pay award, like damages, is
a payment of money by the official. Hence it should be granted only
if the court finds that the official is not protected by executive
immunity. 95
The personal liability of federal officials in § 1981 damage suits
may lead CongTess to enact an indemnification statute.'" Any pro-
vision for indemnification will necessarily reduce the deterrent effect
of subjecting officials to personal liability. So long as indemnification
is partial and discretionary, however, the deterrent effect of § 1981
91. See Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (suit against Chairman of
Civil Service Commission challenging use of federal service entrance examination in
hiring and promotion of federal employees).
92. See Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (suit against Secretary of
Defense and others alleging racial discrimination in employment at McClellan Air Force
Base in California).
93. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314-15 n.6 (1975). Several lower courts have
granted equitable relief on the grounds that the policy considerations supporting im-
munity from damages do not apply to immunity from equitable relief. E.g., Boyd v.
Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 86-87 (7th Cir. 1975) (barring damage recovery); Rowley v. McMillan,
502 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (4th Cir. 1974); Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra note 46, at 220
n.4.
94. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975); Stamps v. Detroit Edison
Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906,
921 (5th Cir. 1973) (Title VII suit); Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School Dist., 427
F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1970) (§ 1983 suit).
95. The Scheuer-Wood standard for qualified immunity in § 1981 suits against of-
ficials in their individual capacities is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding that
a finding of bad faith is not necessary for an award of back pay under Title VII. Al-
bemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-25 (1975). The Court, however, did not
announce standards necessary or sufficient for such Title VII awards.
96. At present, there is no federal statute that indemnifies federal officials for em-
ployment discrimination. One reason for this may be that until the Supreme Court
decided Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), many federal officials enjoyed an absolute
immunity from damage suits. Since the doctrine of qualified executive immunity is so
new, it is difficult to assess the need for indemnification. State and local governments
have protected some officials by enacting such statutes or purchasing insurance. See, e.g.,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122 § 34-18.1 (1975) (school district employees indemnified against
suits for negligence or violations of civil rights).
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actions could be preserved.9 The Government would base its decision
to indemnify on its own determination of good faith and reasonable-
ness, making awards with a conscious effort to preserve the penalty
for discrimination. Even if the Government finds that the official
acted either unreasonably or in bad faith, it might pay part of the
judgment to assure that the victim of discrimination is quickly and
fully compensated.
The need for indemnification will be considerably reduced if juries
finding liability under the Scheuer-Wood test refuse to make sizeable
awards of back pay and damages. 98 Juries are always free to deny puni-
tive damages,99 and in employment discrimination cases they have
considerable flexibility in deciding how much the victim should be
compensated for the "stigma" of discrimination-intangible injuries
such as humiliation and mental anguish.100 Consequently, victims of
discrimination should try to tap the Government's pocket as well as the
official's.
B. Sovereign Immunity and Recovery from the Government
Simultaneously with a § 1981 suit against the official in his personal
capacity, a suit to recover back pay from the Government may be
brought under either Title VII or § 1981. Title VII expressly waives
sovereign immunity and authorizes recovery of up to two years back
pay. However, it does not allow damage awards and requires the
litigant to exhaust a cumbersome administrative process or wait 180
days before suing in federal district court.' 0 '
In a § 1981 suit against the official in his official capacity, back pay
recovery is not limited to two years, and exhaustion may not be re-
97. Jaffe, supra note 55, at 216-17, 229-30.
98. In a class action suit the potential personal liability of an official could be
enormous. Fear that juries would not make large awards against public officials may
explain why plaintiffs have so far refrained from pressing class action damage suits
against officials in their personal capacities.
99. E.g., Lee v. Southern Homes Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 294 (5th Cir. 1970).
100. Sec note 21 supra.
101. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f), (g), 2000e-16(d) (Supp. IV 1974); notes 10, 18, 19 suf'a.
To date, only one action has been brought claiming back pay from the Government under
Title VII and back pay and damages from the official under § 1981. Fleming v. Simon,
397 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (court denied defendants' motion for a protective
order). The court recognized that it faced a novel situation:
What procedures the district court is to follow in getting the issues in a case such
as this tried and determined will have to be sorted out as the case moves along; no
appellate court has given practical guidelines for proceeding simultaneously with a
Title VII claim and a § 1981 claim.
The court did not suggest what such guidelines might be, nor how liability might be
apportioned between the Government and the official.
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quired.10 2 Sovereign immunity, however, may pose a serious prob-
lem. A growing number of lower courts now recognize that sovereign
immunity does not bar § 1981 suits alleging racial discrimination in
employment.10 3 It may, however, limit the relief which the court may
grant.'0 4 Unless the Government has consented to be sued, sovereign
immunity absolutely bars a damage award paid by the Government.0
It is unclear whether sovereign immunity also prevents a back pay
award against the Government as part of the equitable remedy of
reinstatement. Although no court has yet made such an award, it can
be argued that back pay should be included with other forms of
equitable relief permitted under the sovereign immunity doctrine.1°6
In addition, the Fifth Circuit has suggested a mandamus route around
102. See notes 23, 25 supra.
103. Prior to 1972, most courts followed Judge (now Justice) Blackmun's ruling in
Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, 1277 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934
(1970), that sovereign immunity absolutely bars federal employment discrimination suits.
See Abernathy, supra note 5, at 337-40. However, shortly after the 1972 amendments to
Title VII were enacted, the Fifth Circuit began to retreat from the Gnotta position. Id.
at 341-44. Other courts have agreed with the Fifth Circuit that sovereign immunity is
not an absolute bar to a § 1981 claim of federal employment discrimination. Bowers v.
Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974); Henry v. Schlesinger, 44 U.S.L.W. 2375 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 7, 1976); Jones v. Brennan, 401 F. Supp. 622 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Revis v. Laird, 391 F.
Supp. 1133 (E.D. Cal. 1975); Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 388 F. Supp.
1205, 1209 (D. Md. 1975); Abernathy, supra note 5, at 341-45. But see Baca v. Butz, 394
F. Supp. 888 (D. N.M. 1975); Archuleta v. Callaway, 385 F. Supp. 384 (D. Colo. 1974);
Willingham v. Lynn, 381 F. Supp. 1119 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
104. Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 1974); Abernathy, supra note
5, at 341-43, 345 ("the courts are searching for standards to define what role sovereign
immunity should play in determining relief for plaintiffs who are successful in establish-
ing federal employment discrimination"); Freed, supra note 42, at 407.
105. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963). It has been suggested that § 1981
may constitute a congressional waiver of sovereign immunity and thereby allow both
back pay and damages to be collected from the federal treasury. 41 GEO. WASH. L.J. 657,
663-64 (1973). But see Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703 (1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (1974) (en banc).
106. Freed, supra note 42, at 401, asserts that "a distinction between awards of back
pay and attorneys' fees on the one hand, and other equitable relief on the other, cannot
be sustained." He points out that equitable relief ordered against the Government has
"frequently required expenditures from the public treasury." Id. at 398. This view that
back pay should be treated as a form of equitable relief for purposes of sovereign im-
munity may seem inconsistent with the position taken at p. 536 supra that back pay
should be treated as damages for purposes of executive immunity. However, there is a
reason not to distinguish between back pay and other equitable relief when they are
ordered against the Government, but to distinguish between them when they are or-
dered against the official: equitable relief other than back pay requires expenditures
by the Government, but not the official.
For another argument that sovereign immunity does not bar back pay awards against
the Government, see Abernathy, supra note 5 (concluding from a separation-of-powers
analysis that court orders granting reinstatement with back pay do not unduly impinge
on Congress's duty to regulate the public fisc, but rather help to enforce a stated
nondiscrimination policy given high priority by both the legislative and executive
branches).
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sovereign immunity that may allow for the recovery of back pay from
the Government.0 7 Should the courts eliminate the sovereign im-
munity obstacle to back pay awards against the Government, the § 1981
suit against the official both in his personal and in his official capac-
ity1° would provide an even more potent weapon to combat federal
employment discrimination than the combination presently available
-a § 1981 claim against the official coupled with a Title VII claim
against the Government.
Either combination, however, provides the victim of discrimination
with access to the pockets of both the Government and the official.
The courts have yet to resolve the difficult question of how to appor-
tion liability between the Government and the official in order to
further the Title VII goals of deterrence and compensation. One ap-
proach would be to assess back pay against the Government and
damages against the official. 109 Such an apportionment might reduce
107. In Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133, 1137-38 (5th Cir. 1972), the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that although sovereign immunity barred the plaintiff's request for injunctive
relief, the sovereign immunity obstacle could be bypassed by viewing the prayer for
reinstatement with back pay as "an action in the nature of a petition for writ of
mandamus." Id. at 1138. See Abernathy, supra note 5, at 342-43. If back pay awarded
under a mandamus order bypasses the sovereign immunity obstacle, so should back pay
awarded as part of injunctive reinstatement. See Freed, supra note 42, at 407. However,
in Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703-05 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970
(1974) (en bane), the Fifth Circuit indicated that an action for back pay was not in the
nature of a mandamus action, thereby leaving unclear whether mandamus will provide
such recovery.
108. Decisions in two such suits have been reported. In Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp.
1133, 1139-40 (E.D. Cal. 1975), a § 1981 suit was brought against various federal officials
in both their personal and official capacities. Following Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d
1155 (9th Cir. 1974), and Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972), the court rejected
sovereign immunity as an absolute defense, but approved it as a possible limitation on
the relief afforded. However, the court confused sovereign and executive immunity,
citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), for the proposition that "[sovereign im-
munity] may provide a defense of varying degrees to the executive officers involved ......
Since the officers were sued in both their individual and official capacities, the court
should have treated the suit as two separate actions. Insofar as the suit is against the
officials in their individual capacities, it is the doctrine of qualified executive immunity,
not sovereign immunity, that may provide a defense. And Scheuer has nothing to do
with sovereign immunity. See pp. 526-29 supra.
In Miller v. Saxbe, 396 F. Supp. 1260 (D.D.C. 1975), Judge Gesell avoided the problems
posed by a double-bladed § 1981 suit by ruling that the 1972 amendments to Title VII
preempted § 1981 as a cause of action against the officers in their official capacities. He
dismissed the plaintiffs' § 1981 claims against the United States for back pay and promo-
tions, but allowed their § 1981 claims against the individual defendants for damages and
injunctive relief to proceed. He also indicated that the defendants' claim of immunity
would be tested under the Scheuer-Wood standard. In denying the defendants' sub-
sequent motion for summary judgment, Judge Gesell reaffirmed the applicability of the
Scheucr test. Miller v. Saxbe, 403 F. Supp. 1314, 1315-16 (D.D.C. 1975).
109. The recovery of back pay from the Government would necessarily reduce the
deterrent effect of the § 1981 action against the official in his personal capacity. In
many cases, however, the interests of compensating the victim of the discrimination and
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the burden on the official, thereby eliminating the need for indemni-
fication, increasing the willingness of the jury to award damages, and
at the same time retaining the deterrent effect of personal liability.
This suggestion, of course, can only be tentative. It is too early to
recommend precise guidelines for the implementation of the § 1981
damage remedy for federal employment discrimination.
reducing the official's burden would justify such an apportionment of liability. It is
difficult to devise a formula which courts can use to apportion liability in every case,
since at least four variables are involved: the ability of the official to pay, the amount of
back pay assessed, the size of the damage award, and the cause of the discrimination.
